Using a stochastic volatility option pricing model, we show that the implied volatilities of at-the-money options are not necessarily unbiased and that the fixed interval time-series can produce misleading results. Our results do not support the expectations hypothesis: long-term volatilities...

Motivated by recent research on the costs and benefits of political connection, we examine the cost of equity capital of politically connected firms. Using propensity score matching models, we find that politically connected firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital than their non-connected...

We investigate the political determinants of residual state ownership for a unique database of 221 privatized firms operating in 27 emerging countries over the 1980 to 2001 period. After controlling for firm-level and other country-level characteristics, we find that the political institutions...

We investigate the role of ownership structure and investor protection in postprivatization corporate governance. We find that the government relinquishes control over time, mainly to the benefit of local institutions and foreign investors. We also show that private ownership tends to...

This paper seeks to provide an answer to the following question: When and how does privatization work? Using a unique sample of 189 firms headquartered in 32 developing countries, we document a significant increase in profitability, efficiency, investment and output. Next, using univariate...

Using a large sample of 115,534 firm-year observations from 46 countries over the period 1992 to 2007, we investigate the impact of political institutions on firms’ growth. We find that high levels of political constraint spur firms’ growth and that this positive impact is more pronounced in...

We investigate the impact of political institutions on corporate risk-taking. Using a large sample of non-financial firms from 77 countries covering the period from 1988 to 2008, we find that sound political institutions are positively associated with corporate risk-taking, and that this...

We examine the influence of political rights on the implied cost of equity capital using a sample of firms from 44 countries. We find that firms' equity financing costs are lower when political rights are stronger. We further find that political institutions' direct impact on the cost of equity...