In this article we examine the setting up of an eductive type of reasoning process in a negative feedback situation. We analyse a variant of a one-shot beauty contest game. Our results show a reasoning level of around 2 steps of introspection, which is enough to reach rapidly the rational...

We investigate experimentally a new variant of the beauty contest game (BCG) in which players’ actions are strategic substitutes (a negative feedback BCG). Our results show that chosen numbers are closer to the rational expectation equilibrium than in a strategic complements environment...

This paper shows that if a very small, exogenously given probability of terminating the exchange is introduced in an elementary investment game, more reciprocators will choose the defection strategy. Everything happens as if they “hide behind probabilities” in order to break the trust...

This article aims to analyse consumers' preferences for Integrated Pest Management (IPM), in comparison to conventional and organic food products. It analyses the case of tomatoes, based on experimental data of 189 French consumers. We find that consumers are more interested in information on...

We experimentally test in a developing country whether people prefer a situation where individual and social interests coincide, a situation promoting equality or another one promoting a better relative position. We also investigate whether incentive compatible choices are consistent with...

This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective...

Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real effort task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design to examine whether cheating is reference-dependent. Our experimental...

We investigate the dynamics of cooperation in public good games when contributions to the public good are immediately redistributed across contributors (intra-temporal transfers) and when contributions to the public good by the current group are transferred over time to a future group...