Formal contracting addresses the moral hazard problems inherent in interfirm deals via explicit terms designed to achieve incentive alignment. Alternatively, when firms expect to interact repeatedly, relational mechanisms may achieve similar results without the associated costs. However, as we...

We analyze what can be inferred about a game's information structure solely from the probability distributions on action profiles generated during play; i.e., without reference to special behavioral assumptions or equilibrium concepts. Our analysis focuses on deriving payoff-independent...

Transaction cost economics argues that aligning transactions with governance structures leads to more efficient outcomes. While empirical evidence demonstrates that firms choose governance consistent with transaction cost predictions, the performance implications of governance choices are less...

This study examines how firms choose organizational form for their R&D alliances. Encouraging cooperation in these alliances is often challenging, given the difficulties in knowledge sharing between partners and protecting the property rights over partner knowledge. Interestingly,...

Most prior event studies find that the announcement of a new alliance is accompanied by a positive stock market response for the partners. This result has usually been interpreted as evidence for the prevailing view that alliances are effective vehicles for partners to acquire or access new...