optimal for the seller to do away with any matching considerations and allocate the contract on the basis of price alone. If … matching is sufficiently important to the seller, the optimal mechanism may be implemented without commitment. However, if … matching is not sufficiently important, the seller suffers a loss when he is unable to commit. The magnitude of this loss …

In many auctions, matching between the bidder and seller raises the value of the contract for both parties. However … depresses bids. The more matching matters, the greater the penalty associated with observing the matches. …

courses and courses have implicit preferences for students. This formulates a many-to-many matching problem. We show the …

the efficient matching of workers to firms. This mechanism can be thought of as operated by a recruitment agency, an …

two-sided matching literature, we model an auction market for emissions permits as a two-sided matching procedure and … based on the objectives of all the players, characterize a set of stable matching rules that lead to the core allocation. We … show that matching based allocation mechanism retains the essence of grandfathering by keeping the reservation price for …

Using a mechanism design framework, we characterize how a profit-maximizing intermediary can design matching markets … version of positive assortative matching (what we call truncated positive assortative matching) maximizes profits. Under these …

This paper studies how an intermediary should design two-sided matching markets when agents are privately informed … sufficient conditions for assortative matching to be profit- or welfare-maximizing, and then show how to implement the optimal … match and payments through two-sided position auctions. This sharpens our understanding of intermediated matching markets by …