Changes in the global economy and technological advances are stimulating an increasing geographic distribution of new product design and development efforts. For large organizations that design and develop complex products, this geographic distribution has added a new layer of complexity to...

Product architecture and organizational communication play significant roles in complex product development efforts. By using networks to characterize both product structure and communication patterns, we examine the impact of mismatches between these on new product development (NPD)...

In Chapter 1 we study price determination in a market with n identical buyers and a seller who initially commits to some capacity. Sales are sequential and each price is determined by strategic bargaining. A unique subgame perfect equilibrium exists. It is characterized by absence of costly...

We present a stylized model of the over-the-counter (OTC) markets in the tradition of Duffie, Gârleanu, and Pedersen 2005 with three distinctive features: (i) Buyers' willingness to pay is private information. (ii) Dividends depend on the state of the macro economy. (iii) Sellers become...

The US housing market exhibits seasonal boom and bust cycles where prices and the speed of trade (turnover rate) rise in summers and fall in winters. We present a search model that analytically generates the observed cycles. The proposed mechanism is based on swings in market thickness rather...

We endogenize the trading mechanism selection in a model of directed search with risk averse buyers and show that the unique symmetric equilibrium entails all sellers using fixed price trading. Mechanisms that prescribe the sale price as a function of the realized demand (auctions, bargaining,...

We study equilibrium prices and trade volume in a market with several identical buyers and a seller who commits to an inventory and then offers goods sequentially. Prices are determined by a strategic costly bargaining process with a random sequence of proponents. A unique subgame perfect...

We study a market where identical capacity-constrained sellers compete to attract identical buyers, via price advertisements. Once buyers reach a store, prices might be renegotiable in a manner that is responsive to excess demand. We focus strongly symmetric equilibria, proving their existence...