We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group mem- bers in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members' efforts and...

We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any individual player may value the prize differently within and across groups. Players expend costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only the highest effort...

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests and show that asymmetric equilibria may arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We also identify contests in the literature where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak...

We examine conditions under which a platform firm can exclude rivals by bundling a product that some on one side of the market regard as essential with its platform, and pursue implications for market performance. We show that the impact of an exclusive dealing contract between the upstream firm...

We investigate situations in which players make costly contributions as group members in a group conflict, and at the same time engage in contest with fellow group members to appropriate the possible reward. We introduce within group power asymmetry and complementarity in members’ efforts, and...

We consider a multi-winner nested elimination contest in which losers are sequentially eliminated to attain the set of winners. This is a variant of a widely used mechanism introduced by Clark and Riis (1996) that allows one to select the winners sequentially. We show that the current mechanism...

We analyze a group all-pay auction with a group specific public good prize in which one group follows a weakest-link and the other group follows a best-shot impact function. This type of game depicts situations in which the best-shot group is an attacker and the other group is a defender. We...

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

We analyze a group contest in which n groups compete to win a group-specific public good prize. Group sizes can be different and any player may value the prize differently within and across groups. Players exert costly efforts simultaneously and independently. Only the highest effort (the...

We study experimentally the effects of cost structure and prize allocation rules on the performance of rent-seeking contests. Most previous studies use a lottery prize rule and linear cost, and ?nd both overbidding relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction and signi?cant variation of efforts,...