Son preference is widespread in a number of developing countries. Anecdotal evidence suggests that women may contribute to the persistence of this phenomenon because they derive substantial long-run non-monetary benefits from giving birth to a son in the form of an improvement in their...

This paper explores how the relative circumstances of men and women following marital dissolution affect sex-selection behavior within marriages. China's 2001 divorce reform liberalized divorce in favor of women and secured women's property rights after separation. We use this improvement in...

I propose a model of household decision-making under asymmetric information and show that resulting allocations may not be fully cooperative. The model yields a simple test for cooperative decision-making, which I apply to data from China. I find that, when the father migrates without his...

This paper argues that wives in developing countries use domestic labour as a tool to incentivise husbands, especially when they lack power and cannot credibly threaten divorce. In Malawi, husbands often supplement farm income with wage labour. In our model, this creates moral hazard: husbands...

This paper draws on an original dataset collected in Benin which features data at the individual level. We first provide evidence that suggest that husband and wife are not pooling their respective incomes and thus are not making expenditure decisions on the basis of one common budget. As we...

We apply the collective consumption model of Browning, Chiappori and Lew- bel (2006) to analyse economic well-being and poverty among the elderly. The model focuses on individual preferences, a consumption technology that captures the economies of scale of living in a couple, and a sharing rule...

It is unlikely that husbands and wives always agree on exactly what public goods to buy. Nor do they necessarily agree on how many hours to work with obvious consequences for the household budget. We therefore model consumption and labor supply behavior of a couple in a non-cooperative setting...

The methodology by Lazear and Michael (1988) is used to decompose household expenditures into that for adults and children. Some specific estimation procedures are modified and cross section-time series (panel) data are used to control for household level heterogeneity. In addition, a new and...

It is unlikely that husbands and wives always agree on exactly what public goods to buy. Nor do they necessarily agree on how many hours to work with obvious consequences for the household budget. We therefore model consumption and labor supply behavior of a couple in a non-cooperative setting...

The methodology by Lazear and Michael (1988) is used to decompose household expenditures into that for adults and children. Some specific estimation procedures are modified and cross section-time series (panel) data are used to control for household level heterogeneity. In addition, a new and...