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We propose a theoretical explanation for the so-called “beauty premium”. Our explanation is based entirely on search frictions and the fact that physical appearance plays an important role in attracting a marriage partner. We analyse the interaction between frictional labour and marriage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011200049
In this paper we propose a new theoretical explanation for the existence of male marriage wage premium, based entirely on search frictions. We analyse the interaction of frictional labour and marriage markets. We present and explore a search equilibrium characterised by wage dispersion where...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010719517
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This paper considers an equilibrium search model with on-the-job search where firms set wages.We look at optimal employment contracts when workers are heterogeneous and choose search intensity. Firms may want to retain their good workers by matching any offers that these employees may receive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005767552
It is a well-established fact that many people view the prospect of premature death by some causes with considerably more disquiet or “dread” than death by other causes. It is equally clear that for most people their personal risk of death by a given cause is also a matter of serious...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005809626
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I analyse an economy where a search labour market and a matching marriage market interact. The economy is populated by homogeneous workers, firms and marriage partners (MPs). Workers simultaneously search for firms in order to work and for MPs in order to marry. Firms post wages to attract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036836
The paper studies a matching model with on-the-job search, transferable utility and heterogeneous agents. Matched agents can set the conditions under which a given match can be dissolved. It is shown that matched agents use sign-off fees to extract all capital gains from trade when a third agent...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005082079
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