The famous theorem of R. Aumann and M. Maschler states that the sequence of values of an <InlineEquation ID="IEq1"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$N$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi>N</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation>-stage zero-sum game <InlineEquation ID="IEq2"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\varGamma _N(\rho )$$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <msub> <mi mathvariant="italic">Γ</mi> <mi>N</mi> </msub> <mrow> <mo stretchy="false">(</mo> <mi mathvariant="italic">ρ</mi> <mo stretchy="false">)</mo> </mrow> </mrow> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> with incomplete information on one side and prior distribution <InlineEquation ID="IEq3"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$\rho $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mi mathvariant="italic">ρ</mi> </math> </EquationSource> </InlineEquation> converges as <InlineEquation ID="IEq4"> <EquationSource Format="TEX">$$N\rightarrow \infty $$</EquationSource> <EquationSource Format="MATHML"> <math xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> <mrow> <mi>N</mi>...</mrow></math></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation></equationsource></equationsource></inlineequation>

Voting and assignment are two of the most fundamental settings in social choice theory. For both settings, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known rule that satisfies anonymity, ex post efficiency, and strategyproofness. Recently, it was shown that computing the resulting probabilities...

Condorcet's paradox is one of the most prominent results in social choice theory. It says that there may not exist any alternative that a net majority prefers over every other alternative. When outcomes need not be deterministic alternatives, we show that a similar paradox still exists even if...

In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is a well-known generalization of random dictatorship that...