We study the effects on the food market of the introduction of biofuels as a substitute for fossil fuel in the energy market. We consider a world economy with an oil cartel and a competitive fringe of farmers producing energy in the form of biofuels. Farmers also produce food and sell it on the...

Suppose that a group have demands for some good. Each one of them owns a technology to produce the good, with these technologies varying in their effectiveness. We consider technologies exhibiting either increasing return to scale (IRS) or decreasing returns to scale (DRS). In each case, we...

The notion of veto player was originally introduced in simple games [see Nakamura (1979)], for which every coalition has a value of 0 or 1. In this paper we extend it to monotonic cooperative games with transferable utility: a player has veto power if all coalitions not containing her are...

In the cost sharing model with technological cooperation, we investigate the implications of a number of consistency requirements. In a context where the enforcing authority cannot prevent agents from splitting or merging their demands (in order to reduce their cost shares), the methods used...

The present paper examines zero-sum games that are based on a cyclic preference relation defined over anonymous actions. For each of these games, the set of Nash equilibria is characterized. When the number of actions is odd, a unique Nash equilibrium is always obtained. On the other hand, in...

For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate cost shares to the players according to some lexicographic preference relation. The average of all such lexicographic rules is shown to satisfy many desirable...

This article proposes a setting that allows for technological cooperation in the cost sharing model. Dealing with discrete demands, we study two properties: additivity and dummy. We show that these properties are insufficient to guarantee a unit-flow representation similar to that of Wang (Econ...

For the class of shortest path games, we propose a family of new cost sharing rules satisfying core selection. These rules allocate shares according to some lexicographic preference relation. A computational procedure is provided. Our results relate to those of Tijs et al. (2011).

In the discrete cost sharing model with technological cooperation (Bahel and Trudeau in Int J Game Theory 42:439–460, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">2013a</CitationRef>), we study the implications of a number of properties that strengthen the well-known dummy axiom. Our main axiom, which requires that costless units of demands do not...</citationref>