I analyze the post-electoral coalition formation process in a two dimensional political environment. The two dimensions are the degree of a proportional tax rate and the degree of a group-speci?c public good. Parties are o¢ ce-motivated and care instrumentally about policy. I analyze when...

I analyze the postelectoral coalition formation process in a two-dimensional political environment. The two dimensions are the degree of a proportional tax rate and the degree of a group-specific public good. Parties are office-motivated and care instrumentally about policy. I analyze when...

The existence of punishment opportunities has been shown to cause efficiency in public goods experiments to increase considerably. In this paper we ask whether punishment also has a downside in terms of process dissatisfaction. We conduct an experiment to study the conjecture that an environment...

This experimental study examines latent racial prejudice toward out-groups among 152 Spanish college students when they make guesses about the contributions of others in a public good game. Prejudice is examined firstly from the perspective of a two-sided, implicitly-held belief toward any of...

This study examined latent racial prejudice towards specified out-groups among 152 Spanish college students in a two-stage research strategy using a public goods game. When asked how generous various out-groups are, Asian, and Western groups were perceived as more generous than the in-group,...

We study the effects of voluntary leadership in experimental public goods games when each group member can volunteer to contribute before the other members. We find that voluntary leadership increases contributions significantly, compared to a treatment where leadership is enforced exogenously.