In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provides incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive...

Traditionally, underwriting performance is considered to be a function of industry-specific institutions. Using quarterly data from 1974 through 1990, we provide evidence of a long-run link between the general economy and the underwriting performance as measured by the combined ratio. Using...

We use two reserve error definitions found in the literature to investigate the joint impact of previously studied incentives on the magnitude of reserve error. We find many prior conclusions are dependent upon the restricted setting in which the hypotheses are tested and on the definition of...

We present experimental evidence on the effect of adverse selection on coverage choices and pricing in corporate insurance markets. Two sets of experimental data are presented to gauge these effects. In the first set, subject behavior appears to conform to the unique equilibrium in which high...

This paper presents a theoretical and empirical analysis of the effects of no fault automobile insurance on fatal accident rates. As a mechanism for compensating the victims of automobile accidents, no fault has several important advantages over the tort system. However, by restricting access to...

Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers who sell insurance in both competitive...

Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers who sell insurance in both competitive...

There has been a net propensity over the last decade for the dominant rating agency of the U.S. insurance industry, A.M. Best, to downgrade property-liability insurers. This could reflect a general deteriorating credit worthiness of the industry or an increase in the performance thresholds...

The paper analyzes the effect of competition between credit rating agencies (CRAs) on the information content of ratings. We show that a monopolistic CRA pools sellers into multiple rating classes and has partial market coverage. This provides an opportunity for market entry. The entrant designs...

There has been a net propensity over the last decade for the dominant rating agency of the U.S. insurance industry, A.M. Best, to downgrade property-liability insurers. This could reflect a general deteriorating credit worthiness of the industry or an increase in the performance thresholds...