This study provides evidence regarding the effects of online trading on stock market reactions to quarterly earnings announcements. We test for differences in stock price and volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements between a period with a significant amount of online trading...

We document a change in the nature of trading volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements over the time period 1976-2005. Consistent with Landsman and Maydew (2002), we find that the magnitude of abnormal trading volume around quarterly earnings announcements has increased over time and...

We study cross-sectional differences in pre-announcement and event-period private information acquisition across firm size and institutional ownership using trading volume reactions to earnings announcements. We find that abnormal volume associated with absolute price change increases with both...

This study provides evidence on the effects of online trading on stock price and trading volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements. We test for differences in stock price and volume reactions to quarterly earnings announcements between a period with a significant amount of online...

We contribute to the literature on Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD) in three ways. First, we provide evidence on whether FD has achieved its intended effect of leveling the information playing field by examining whether differences across investors' information quality prior to earnings...

We document that Regulation Fair Disclosure has reduced differences in information quality between investors prior to quarterly earnings announcements consistent with the intent of the regulation. This reduction is driven by small firms and high technology firms, rather than the large firms...

This study provides empirical evidence on factors that drive differential interpretation of earnings announcements. We document that Kandel and Pearson's forecast measures of differential interpretation are decreasing in proxies for earnings quality and pre-announcement information quality. This...

In agency theory, offering a flat salary contract under unobservable effort creates a moral hazard problem because the agent is motivated to shirk and provide less than a previously agreed-upon level of effort. We examine a moral solution to this moral hazard problem. In particular, we present a...