Recent corporate governance reforms focus on the board's independence and encourage equity ownership by directors. We analyze the efficacy of these reforms in a model in which both adverse selection and moral hazard exist at the level of the firm's management. Delegating governance to the board...

Recent corporate governance reforms focus on board independence and encourage equity ownership by directors. We analyze the efficacy of these reforms in a model where both adverse selection and moral hazard are present at the level of the firm's management. Delegating governance to the board...

We analyze the voluntary disclosure decision of a manager when analysts scrutinize the quality of disclosure. We derive an equilibrium in which managers voluntarily disclose unfavorable information only if sufficiently precise, but disclose favorable news with lower levels of accuracy. We show...

We examine optimal equity-based incentives for the Board of Directors (BOD) in a hierarchical agency framework. The underlying agency problem is due to a shareholder-manager conflict on investment policy. There is an endogenous demand for directors to monitor the quality of the firm's investment...

By addressing the interaction between security market microstructure and the generalized agency conflict between managers and shareholders, we study the effects of informed insider trading on productive efficiency, price discovery, and wealth redistribution. Insider trading can lead...

We present fresh evidence on the validity of the dividend signaling hypothesis (DSH), by using a new testing approach. We test the unambiguous prediction from the DSH that the association between current dividend changes and future profitability is stronger for firms with higher marginal net...