We study the optimal timing of merger control by comparing the pre-and post closing enforcement. Mergers have both pro- and anticompetitive effects, and the parties(the agency and the merging …firms) veri…able information on them is endogenous: it depends on the timing of the merger control,...

The purpose of this paper is to study the relative impact of public and private competition law enforcement on antitrust liability. We develop a model with asymmetric information during trial, where the number of cases filed depends on the amount of damages awarded and on the standard of...

This paper examines the optimal use of remedies and the efficiency defense for merger control. We develop a framework in which merger efficiency gains are endogenously determined and are not observed by the Competition Authority. The possibility of an efficiency defense can push firms to design...

This paper examines the interaction between two branches of the competition policy, the merger control and the anticartel fighting. Our model takes into account both the imperfect information of the competition agency on the quality of coordination projects undertaken by the industry firms, and...

This paper deals with the optimal enforcement of competition law between merger and anti-cartel policies. We examine the interaction between these two branches of antitrust, given the budget constraint of the public agency, and taking into account the ensuing incentives for firms in terms of...

This paper deals with the enforcement of merger policy, and aims to study how merger emedies affect the deterrence accomplished by controlling mergers. We determine the optimal frequency of investigations launched by the agency, and identify situations where the introduction of remedies can lead...