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When a firm has external debt and monitoring by shareholders is essential, managerial bonuses are shown to be an optimal solution. A small managerial bonus linked to firm's performance not only reduces moral hazard between managers and shareholders, but also between creditors and monitoring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012711581
This paper shows how separation of ownership and control may arise as a response to overload costs, despite agency costs, and how conglomerates arise as solution to information asymmetries in capital markets. In a context where entrepreneurs have the ability to run projects and improve their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012712184
This paper analyzes the optimality of multiple-bank lending, when firms and banks are subject to moral hazard and monitoring is essential. Multiple-bank lending leads to higher per-project monitoring whenever the benefit of greater diversification dominates the costs of free-riding and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012710163
In a model where banks play an active role in monitoring borrowers, we analyze the impact of securitization on bankers’ incentives across different macroeconomic scenarios. We show that securitization can be part of the optimal financing scheme for banks, provided banks retain an equity tranche...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012711042
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This paper investigates the determinants of the structure of the banking industry by fitting a monopolistic competition model to a sample of banks drawn from eight EEC countries over 1989-1993. In the theoretical model, banks decide strategically both entry and the branching size of their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005639429
This paper investigates the determinants of the structure of the banking industry by fitting a monopolistic competition model to a sample of banks drawn from eight EEC countries over 1989-1993. In the theoretical model, banks decide strategically both entry and the branching size of thier...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005207720
This paper shows how separation of ownership and control may arise as a response to overload costs, despite agency costs, and how conglomerates arise as solution to information asymmetries in capital markets. In a context where entrepreneurs have the ability to run projects and improve their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009439907