The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a common prior in a two-person signaling game. For a specific probability distribution of the sender’s type, the long-run behavior...

The global expansion of urban slums poses questions for economic research as well as problems for policymakers. We provide evidence that the type of poverty observed in contemporary slums of the developing world is characteristic of that described in the literature on poverty traps. We document...

In many countries, local governments struggle with inefficiency and corruption, often perpetuated by entrenched elites. This paper explores how leadership changes affect bureaucratic performance at the local level by combining detailed personnel surveys with a regression discontinuity design in...

We use regression discontinuity and regression kink designs to estimate the impact of need-based grant aid on the borrowing and educational attainment of students enrolled in a large public university system. Pell Grant aid substantially reduces borrowing: among students who would borrow in the...

In this paper, we report an experimental investigation of the effect of framing on social preferences, as revealed in a one-shot linear public goods game. We use two indicators to measure social preferences: self-reported emotional responses; and, as a behavioural indicator of disapproval,...

We study the interplay between leading-by-example and group identity in a three-person sequential voluntary contributions game experiment. A common identity between the leader and her two followers is beneficial for cooperation: average contributions are more than 30% higher than in a benchmark...

classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well known median voter result and the two-sided policy differentiation outcome, the...

The common prior assumption is pervasive in game-theoretic models with incomplete information. This paper investigates experimentally the importance of inducing a correct common prior in a two-person signaling game. Equilibrium selection arguments predict that different equilibria may be...

We study both theoretically and experimentally the set of Nash equilibria of a classical one-dimensional election game with two candidates. These candidates are interested in power and ideology, but their weights on these two motives are not necessarily identical. Apart from obtaining the well...

In the last thirty years, economists and other social scientists have investigated people's normative views on distributive justice. Here we study people's normative views in social dilemmas, which underlie many situations of economic and social significance. Using insights from moral philosophy...