We analyze a situation where a Principal does not necessarily have all the bargaining power while negotiating a contract with an Agent by studying a dynamic multi-objective moral hazard model with hidden action. We .nd that the structure of the optimal contracts change along the Pareto Frontier,...

I analyze a model of hold-up with asymmetric information at the contracting stage. The asymmetry of information concerns the value of trade with external parties. I show that contractual signaling and efficiency of investment can conflict if only quantity is contractible. This conflict generates...

This paper develops an industry evolution model to explore the quantitative implications of endogenous financing constraints for job reallocation. In the model firms finance entry costs and per period labor costs with long-term financial contracts signed with banks, which are subject to...

This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show...

When Court enforcement is excessively difficult or costly, agents are often able to create «endogenous enforcement mechanisms», that is, to design agreements so that each party finds it optimal to carry them out (self-enforcing implicit contracts), thanks to the threat of sanctions affecting...

Electronic commerce and flexible manufacturing allow personalization of initially standardized products at low cost. Will customers provide the information necessary for personalization? Assuming that a consumer can control the amount of information revealed, we analyze how her decision...

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer — the seller — follows from a non–trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer–induced certification acts as an...

Who does, and who should initiate costly certification by a third party under asymmetric quality information, the buyer or the seller? Our answer --- the seller --- follows from a non--trivial analysis revealing a clear intuition. Buyer--induced certification acts as an inspection device, whence...

We employ a unique dataset of 6,669 credit assessments for 3,542 small businesses by nine banks using an identical rating model over the period 2006-2011 to examine (i) to what extent loan officers use their discretion to smooth credit ratings of their clients, and (ii) to assess whether this...

We employ a unique dataset of 6,669 credit assessments for 3,542 small businesses by nine banks using an identical rating model over the period 2006-2011 to examine (i) to what extent loan officers use their discretion to smooth credit ratings of their clients, and (ii) to assess whether this...