We present two axiomatizations of the Second-Order Expected Utility model in the context of the standard models of choice under uncertainty.

The idea of representing choice under uncertainty as a trade-off between mean returns and some measure of risk or uncertainty is fundamental to the analysis of investment decisions. In this paper, we show that preferences can be characterized in this way, even in the absence of ob jective...

We axiomatize, in an Anscombe–Aumann framework, the class of preferences that admit a representation of the form V(f)=μ−ρ(d), where μ is the mean utility of the act f with respect to a given probability, d is the vector of state-by-state utility deviations from the mean, and ρ(d) is a...

We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in the context of Harsanyiʼs impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show what additional axiom is necessary and sufficient for the observer to exhibit...

The idea of representing choice under uncertainty as a trade-off between mean returns and some measure of risk or uncertainty is fundamental to the analysis of investment decisions. In this paper, we show that preferences can be characterized in this way, even in the absence of objective...

What is the relationship between an agent's attitude towards information, and her attitude towards risk? If an agent always prefers more information, does this imply that she obeys the independence axiom? We provide a substitution property on preferences that is equivalent to the agent...

We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a dynamically consistent agent always to prefer more informative signals (in single-agent problems). These conditions do not imply recursivity, reduction or independence. We provide a simple definition of dynamically consistent behavior, and we...

We survey recent theoretical research on the effects of short-term share-price based managerial incentive schemes. Such schemes can induce inefficient managerial behaviour in both hidden action and hidden type contexts. These problems arise from informational asymmetries: managers take actions...