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Labor has a large contractual claim on a firm's cash flow. Labor equity ownership gives employees both a fractional stake in the firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to otherwise similar firms, labor-controlled publicly traded firms invest less, take fewer...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012710194
Equity ownership gives labor both a fractional stake in the firm's residual cash flows and a voice in corporate governance. Relative to other firms, labor-controlled publicly-traded firms deviate more from value maximization, invest less in long-term assets, take fewer risks, grow more slowly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012754543
This paper presents evidence on how directors who are active CEOs of other firms affect firm behavior and board effectiveness. I show that shareholders incur significant costs when other CEOs serve on the board. CEOs are paid more and their compensation is less sensitive to firm performance....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012712661
We study the effects of the intensity of board monitoring on directors' effectiveness in performing their monitoring and advising duties. We find that monitoring quality improves when a majority of independent directors serve on at least two of the three principal monitoring committees. These...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012754900
Classified boards are the focus of recent shareholder activism aimed at improving U.S. corporate governance. Although critics argue that classified boards reduce directors' effectiveness, proponents counter that they enhance corporate stability, board independence, and long-term strategic risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012754930
This paper shows that classified boards destroy value by entrenching management and reducing director effectiveness. First, I show that classified boards are associated with a significant reduction in firm value and that this holds even among complex firms, although such firms are often regarded...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012755601
We study the determinants and effects of the relative compensation of top executives and lower-level employees. First, we show that CEO–employee pay ratios depend on the balance of power between the CEO (relative to the board) and ordinary employees (relative to management). Second, our...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010679269
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010132134
We find that analysts who frequently revise their stock recommendations outperform those who do not. This result holds for portfolios formed on the basis of favorable changes in recommendations as well as unfavorable changes. The frequency of revision captures information incremental to factors...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011042106
We find that seasoned equity issuers who pay more in underwriting costs are associated with larger improvements in investor recognition, greater contemporaneous increases in firm value, and larger declines in illiquidity risk. We identify increased analyst following as an important channel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010753528