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In this paper, we demonstrate that the existence of sequential equilibria may depend on the players holding beliefs which are tailored to the respective equilibrium but otherwise difficult to justify. We also discuss potential remedies.
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This paper explores experimentally the effects of costly communication possibilities in market entry games. It is shown that these effects depend on whether entry costs are symmetric or asymmetric. In the former, but not the latter case, communication possibilities increase coordination success...
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We analyse symmetric coordination games à la Bryant (1983) where a number of players simultaneously choose efforts from a compact interval and the lowest effort determines the output of a public good. Assuming that payoffs are concave in the public good and linear in effort, this game has a...
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