We consider a persuasion game where multiple experts with potentially conflicting self-interests attempt to persuade a decision-maker, say, a judge. The judge prefers to take an action that is most appropriate given the true state of the world but the experts' preferences over the actions are...

We consider a persuasion game between a decision-maker and a panel of biased experts. The decision-maker prefers to take an action in [0, 1] that matches the underlying state but relies on the experts to learn the state. Each expert has his `ideal` action or `agenda` and may conceal unfavorable...

Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatising their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). In an international mixed oligopoly, we analyse the interaction between privatisation...

Many developing countries are liberalizing their economies to allow higher equity participation by the foreign firms. We argue that the possibility of joint venture can reduce the number of technology transfers. Hence, joint venture can reduce the welfare of a host-country by creating higher...

We study the role of inter-group differences in the emergence of conflict. In our setting, two groups compete for the right to allocate society’s resources, and we allow for costly inter-group mobility. The winning group offers an allocation, that the opposition can either accept, or reject...

Poor communities sometimes resist private investment and destroy economic surplus even if the government has the willingness and ability to redistribute. We interpret such acts of resistance as demands for redistribution: Destruction contains credible information about how the affected group...

Poor communities sometimes resist private investment and destroy economic surplus even if the government has the willingness and ability to redistribute. We interpret such acts of resistance as demands for redistribution: destruction contains credible information about how affected groups value...

We provide a simple condition that is both necessary and sufficient for aggregation of private information in large elections where all voters have the same preference. In some states of the world, all voters prefer A; and in other states, all voters prefer B. Each voter draws a private signal...