This paper examines how the institutional features of emerging economies (i.e., government ownership, political connections, and market reform) influence CEO pay-dispersion incentives. Consistent with our expectation, we find that CEO pay dispersion generally provides a tournament incentive in...

This paper studies how the evolution of market forces affects executive compensation in China's listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2000–2007. Along with the progress of market reforms we find that the level of executive compensation increases gradually and the relation between...

Using a sample of 916 Chinese listed state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, we find that the likelihood of top management turnover is negatively associated with firm performance, suggesting the existence of an effective corporate governance mechanism in an emerging economy that is...

This paper investigates the replacement and appointment of top executives in a business highly involved by the government and their consequences on firm performance and corporate governance. It provides a dynamic setting to test the value of political connection as prior studies do not discern...

This paper investigates control mechanism and accounting information used for control mechanism, shaped by government incentives for business. Using a sample of China's state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from 2001 to 2005, it finds that the likelihood of top management turnover in China's SOEs,...