We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer's investment-banking relationships with...

We investigate whether analyst behavior influenced banks' likelihood of winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings in 1993 to 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer's investment banking relationships with potential competitors for the mandate,...

We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer s investment-banking relationships with...

We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer s investment-banking relationships with...

We investigate directly whether analyst behavior influenced the likelihood of banks winning underwriting mandates for a sample of 16,456 U.S. debt and equity offerings sold between December 1993 and June 2002. We control for the strength of the issuer s investment-banking relationships with...

We investigate why banks pressured research analysts to provide aggressive assessments of issuing firms during the 1990s. This competitive strategy did little to directly increase a bank's chances of winning lead-management mandates and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and costly...

We investigate why banks pressured research analysts to provide aggressive assessments ofissuing firms during the 1990s. This competitive strategy did little to directly increase a bank s chances of winning lead-management mandates and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and costly structural...

We investigate the empirical puzzle why banks pressured their analysts to provide aggressiveassessments of issuing firms during the 1990s when doing so apparently had little positive effect on their chances of receiving lead-management appointments and ultimately led to regulatory penalties and...

IPO initial returns reached astronomical levels during 1999-2000. We show that the regime shift in initial returns and other elements of pricing behavior can be at least partially accounted for by a variety of marked changes in pre-IPO ownership structure and insider selling behavior over...

We estimate the structural links between IPO allocations, pre-market information production, and initial underpricing and find that allocation policies favor institutional investors, both in the U.S. and worldwide increasing institutional allocations results in offer prices that deviate more...