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We study optimal compensation in a fully dynamic framework where the CEO consumes in multiple periods, can undo the contract by privately saving, and can temporarily inflate earnings. We obtain a simple closed-form contract that yields clear predictions for how the level and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012753171
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005059063
Contracts in a dynamic model must address a number of issues absent from static frameworks. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities (e.g. cause options to fall out of the money), and the impact of some CEO actions may not be felt until far in the future. We derive the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008477185
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010626240
remainder in cash. The account features state-dependent rebalancing and time-dependent vesting. It is constantly rebalanced so that the equity fraction remains above a certain threshold; this threshold sensitivity is typically increasing over time even in the absence of career concerns. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010554447
We study optimal executive compensation in a dynamic framework that incorporates many important features of the CEO job absent from a static setting. Shocks to firm value may weaken the incentive effects of securities over time (e.g. drive options out of the money). The CEO can undo the contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010709668
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008367077
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010020693
This paper identifies a broad class of situations in which the contract is both attainable in closed form and detail-neutral. The contract's functional form is independent of the noise distribution and reservation utility; moreover, when the cost of effort is pecuniary, the contract is linear in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012756237
This paper presents a united framework for understanding the determinants of both CEOincentives and total pay levels in competitive market equilibrium. It embeds a modified principal-agent problem into a talent assignment model to endogenize both elements of compensation. The model s closed form...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012756462