This paper addresses the class of generalized agency problems: situations in which adverse selection and moral hazard are jointly present. We present a decomposition of the principal's optimization problem under the first-order approach that sheds light on the interactions between the two types...

Building on the managerial entrenchment literature, we develop and test a novel perspective on payout policy that integrates the influence of internal governance mechanisms, investment opportunities, management compensation, and monitoring by large shareholders. Our study incorporates both...

Merton [1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of Finance 42, 483-510] predicts that idiosyncratic risk should be priced when investors hold sub-optimally diversified portfolios, and cross-sectional stock returns should be positively related to...

A model of endogenous investment booms and busts with rational agents is presented where outside investors are uncertain about both industry (aggregate) and firm-specific capital productivity, and insiders manipulate information through strategic productivity disclosures. For intermediate and...