I consider a repeated principal-agent model with moral hazard, in which the agent has βδ-preferences, which are widely used to capture time-inconsistency. I analyze the case where the agent is sophisticated in the sense that he is fully aware of his inconsistent discounting. I characterize the...

There is a set of incompatible patient–donor pairs and these pairs are matched pairwise. A match between two pairs corresponds to a paired kidney donation, where pairs exchange donated kidneys, or a paired listed exchange, where the first donor donates a kidney to the deceased donor wait-list,...

Böbrek hastalıklarının tedavisinde tercih edilen yöntem böbrek naklidir. Bir böbrek hastasına, yasal olarak sınırlandırılmış yakınlıktaki aile üyelerinden ya da organlarını bağışlamış kadavra donörlerden böbrek nakli yapılabilir. Hastanın, aile üyesi canlı donör...

The natural preference domain for many practical settings of the assignment problems is the one in which agents are allowed to be indifferent between objects, the weak preference domain. Most of the existing work on assignment problems assumes strict preferences. There are important exceptions,...

A random assignment is ordinally efficient if it is not stochastically dominated with respect to individual preferences over sure objects. When there are no private endowments, the set of ordinally efficient random assignments is characterized by the eating algorithm (Bogomolnaia and Moulin,...

Topological separability is crucial for the utility representation of a complete preference relation. When preferences are incomplete, this axiom has suitably defined counterparts: Upper separability and lower separability [Ok, E.A., 2002. Utility representation of an incomplete preference...