This study examines the relevance of bank board structure on bank risk-taking. Using a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (1,534 observations), this study finds that strong bank boards (boards reflecting more of bank shareholders interest) particularly small and less...

This paper examines the trends and endogenous determinants of boards of directors (board size, composition, and CEO duality) for a sample of 212 US bank holding companies, from 1997 to 2004. Overall, the results show that the costs and benefits of boards' monitoring and advising roles could...

This study examines the impact of board size and independent directors on the performance of local commercial banks in Thailand. A panel fixed-effect in the individual regression model is used to examine this relationship over 1999-2003. The results showed a statistically significant negative...

This study examines the effect of family control on the cash holding policy in China. We find that family firms with excess control rights tend to have high cash holdings that are tunneled rather than being invested or paid to shareholders. We further show that the incentive for controlling...

Near-normal incident infrared reflectivity spectra of a (001) YVO<Subscript>4</Subscript> single crystal have been measured at different temperatures in the frequency region between 100 and 6000 cm<Superscript>-1</Superscript>. The reflectivity spectra are analyzed with the factorized form of the dielectric function, and the dielectric...</superscript></subscript>

This paper examines the trends and endogenous formation of bank board structure (size, independence, CEO duality and gender diversity) for a sample of 212 bank holding companies from 1997 to 2004. Overall, the results show that the costs and benefits of boards monitoring and advising roles could...

We investigate the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk‐taking for a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997‐2004 (i.e. 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk while bank shareholders have preference for ‘excessive’...

We investigate the effect of managerial incentives and market power on bank risk-taking for a sample of 212 large US bank holding companies over 1997-2004 (i.e. 1,534 observations). Bank managers have incentives to prefer less risk while bank shareholders have preference for ‘excessive’...

This article examines the risk effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) for the US financial services (FS) industry. The major provisions of SOX relate to increased transparency of the financial reporting system and improved internal governance of firms. The overall results support that...