Most economic analyses presume that there are limited differences in the prior beliefs of individuals, an assumption most often justified by the argument that sufficient common experiences and observations will eliminate disagreements. We investigate this claim using a simple model of Bayesian...

In the reputation literature, players have \emph{commitment types} which represent the possibility that they do not have standard payoffs but instead are constrained to follow a particular plan. In this paper, we show that arbitrary commitment types can emerge from incomplete information about...

We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action a_i is played by a type t_i in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of t_i for which a_i is the only rationalizable plan and whose unique rationalizable belief regarding the play of the game is...

Rationalizability is a central solution concept of game theory. Economic models often have many rationalizable outcomes, motivating economists to use refinements of rationalizability, including equilibrium refinements. In this paper we try to achieve a general understanding of when this...

We analyze "nice" games (where action spaces are compact intervals, utilities continuous and strictly concave in own action), which are used frequently in classical economic models. Without making any "richness" assumption, we characterize the sensitivity of any given Bayesian Nash equilibrium...

A long tradition suggests a fundamental distinction between situations of risk, where true objective probabilities are known, and unmeasurable uncertainties where no such probabilities are given. This distinction can be captured in a Bayesian model where uncertainty is represented by the...

We show that a simple "reputation-style" test can always identify which of two experts is informed about the true distribution. The test presumes no prior knowledge of the true distribution, achieves any desired degree of precision in some fixed finite time, and does not use "counterfactual"...