Consider the cooperative coalition games with side payments. Bargaining sets are calculated for all possible coalition structures to obtain a collection of imputations rather than single imputation. Our aim is to obtain a single payoff vector, which is acceptable by all players of the game under...

Lucas [Lucas, Robert, E., Jr. (1976), "Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique", Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 1, pp 19-46] had argued that interventionist macroeconomics policies may fail because policies themselves affect the optimal behaviour of private agents and...

Largeness of the core is sufficient for stability of the core. In general the necessity is not known. In this paper we answer affirmatively the necessity for symmetric games. We also prove its equivalence to n specified vectors being imputations and also to the convexity of the lower boundary of...

Prolonged worldwide economic depression forces some economists and policy makers to demand tougher regulation to protect their domestic economy. If implemented, this may lead to a high-tariff regime that ruled the pre-globalised world economy. This paper examines the consequences of a tariff...

We study how the shadow economy affects pollution and how this effect depends on corruption levels in public administration. Production in the shadow economy allows firms to avoid environmental regulation policies; a large informal sector may be accompanied by higher pollution levels. Our...

Stringent regulations coupled with corruption generate and sustain extra legal or informal transactions in the developing countries. Does trade related reform discourage informal activities and corruption? This paper attempts to analyze such a phenomenon. An import competing firm allocates...