We investigate government subsidy policies in which a home firm and a foreign firm choose to strategically set prices or quantities in a third market. We show that even though each firm can earn higher profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition regardless of the nature of...

This paper presents a two-stage game, in which in the first stage two multinational firms (MNFs) seeking pollution havens choose a location, that is, whether to export to or undertake FDI in the host country, and in the second stage, these two MNFs and a firm in the host country play a Cournot...

type="main" <p>In this paper, we develop a location model of two multi-national firms (MNFs) with reverse imports and examine the consistency of MNFs' location shift in terms of social welfare in the foreign direct investment (FDI) source (home) country. If fixed costs are incurred in FDI, trade...</p>

Employing the micro data for 1997--2004, we investigate the location decision of Korean-affiliated manufacturing investments in the United States. The conditional logit estimates confirm that although industry-specific Korean agglomeration and domestic agglomeration play an important role, the...

We introduce that the principal and the agent can contract at the ex ante stage, and allow for risk-averse agents with inequity aversion to analyse the properties of the optimal incentive scheme under adverse selection. Contrary to the solutions of standard adverse selection problems, our main...

This paper examines the issue of the first-mover and second-mover advantage in a vertical structure in which each manufacturer trades with a separated retailer via two-part tariffs. Compared to the canonical result in one-tier market, we find that the manufacturers' preference orderings over...