Within the framework of Diamond-Dybvig (1983), the optimal (run free) outcome is shown to be the unique forward induction equilibrium. In a version of the model that posits Bertrand competition among banks, there are sequential equilibria that imply positive profits. However, the zero-profit...

In this paper, we develop a model of money and reserve-holding banks. We allow for private liabilities to circulate as media of exchange in a random-matching framework. Some individuals, which we identify as banks, are endowed with a technology to issue private notes and to keep reserves with a...

We build on our earlier model of money in which bank liabilities circulate as medium of exchange, and investigate the provision of liquidity for a range of central-bank regulations dealing with the potential of bank failure. In our model, banks issue inside money under fractional reserves,...

I study equilibrium selection by an evolutionary process in an environment with multiple equilibria, one of which involves a banking panic. The analysis is built on a repeated version of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983) model. The optimal (run free) equilibrium is uniquely selected if it is also...

We investigate the role of settlement in a dynamic model of a payment system where the ability of participants to perform certain welfare-improving transactions is subject to random and unobservable shocks. In the absence of settlement, the full information first-best allocation cannot be...

Under a monetary policy rule for the nominal interest rate, i.e. the return on risk-free short-term nominal bonds, there may be a unique local equilibrium, but there are in general multiple global equilibria. We show that the appropriate interest rate instruments under uncertainty are...

Can both short and long-term interest rates be targeted independently? Can the target of the term structure help solve the problem of multiplicity of equilibria that occurs when only the short rate is targeted? Both questions are addressed, and the answer is yes to both.

In this paper, we derive principles of optimal cyclical monetary policy in an economy without capital, with a cash-in-advance restriction on household transactions, and monopolistic firms that set prices one period in advance. The only distortionary policy instruments are the nominal interest...

It is believed that a common monetary policy in a monetary union will have identical effects on different countries as long as these countries have identical fundamentals. We show that, when there is specialization in production, the terms of trade react to the shock. The transmission mechanism...