General equilibrium models of oligopolistic competition give rise to relative prices only without determining the price level. It is well known that the choice of a numéraire or, more generally, of a normalization rule converting relative prices into absolute prices entails drastic consequences...

We discuss the case of a monopolist of a base good in the presence of complementary goods provided either by it or by other firms. We assess and calibrate the extent of the influence on the profits from the base good that is created by the existence of complementary goods, i.e., the extent of...

This paper examines one of the most important marketing strategies by software producers on the Internet. That is whether to offer free samples and if so, whether to list the samples on shareware repositories. I show that firms with higher value products have a greater incentive to offer free...

We refute the OECD’s conclusion that Mexico’s telecommunications sector has experienced a lack of competition. The OECD’s conclusion is based on its calculation that high pricing of Mexico’s telecommunications services have caused consumers to lose 129.2 billion (USD) in consumer...

Compared to traditional cost-of-service (COS) regulation, electricity retail competition may lead to lower costs but higher markups. Thus, the net effect on electricity retail prices is ambiguous. This paper uses a difference-in-difference approach to estimate the impact. The results suggest...

We study the role of vertical structure in determining generating capacities and retail prices in the electricity industry. Allowing for uncertain demand, we compare three market configurations: (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) separated duopoly...

We study the role of vertical structure in determining generating capacities and retail prices in the electricity industry. Allowing for uncertain demand, we compare three market configurations: (i) integrated monopoly, (ii) integrated duopoly with wholesale trade, and (iii) separated duopoly...

We provide a two-sided model in a vertical di§erentiation context. We solve the model and we calculate the equilibrium in terms of advertising levels, subscription fees and qualities provision, both in duopoly - two platforms of different quality - and in monopoly case. We would like to...

Several common wisdoms of economic geography and trade theories rely on specific technical assumptions, notably, CES utilities. Krugman’s (1979) general approach to monopolistic competition avoid this limitation, but has too narrow use. We expand it now to a family of multisector models and to...