We examine how international coordination among countries generates a trend towards establishing an international institution for the provision of global public goods. In the present model, the forces creating international agreement are a politician’s motive for re-election and a financial...

Two districts with divergent productivity levels engage in policy-making on the provision of local public goods that enhance future income and hence create a dynamic linkage across periods. The policy choices of district representatives are derived under alternative fiscal systems, and the...

This paper explores the outcome of the noncooperative environmental decision-making under transnational externalities when the national policies are chosen by the elected politicians. Specically, we re-examine the extent of a voter's incentives for supporting politicians who are less green than...

This study investigates the role of fiscal advisors in maintaining government fiscal discipline when the advisor’s appointment is determined endogenously. Our theoretical model shows that an incumbent politician has an incentive to employ an external advisor as a commitment device for fiscal...