The theoretical predictions of how employment protection affects firm productivity are ambiguous. In this paper I study the effect of employment protection rules on labor productivity using micro data on Swedish firms. A reform of the employment protection rules in 2001 made it possible for...

In this paper I study the effect of employment protection rules on firm productivity using micro data on Swedish firms. A reform of the employment protection rules in 2001 made it possible for small firms to exempt two employees from the last-in-first-out rules. The reform targeted only firms...

The statutory protection currently provided by UK law to employees during transfers of undertakings and other restructurings has been criticised on the grounds that it undermines insolvency procedures and interferes with the 'rescue' process. We present an analysis which suggests that granting...

Theory predicts that an increase in employment protection may reduce employment levels by acting as a tax on firms by constraining hiring and firing decisions. We use a unique administrative database of the country’s dispute resolution body – the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and...

We estimate the effects on firm salary, return on assets, and efficiency of wrongful discharge protections adopted by U.S. state courts during 1980-1990. By examining the data of approximately 17,500 commercial banks, we find evidence that all three wrongful discharge doctrines - the public...

We analyse the characteristics of workers who provide work on the basis of a civil or commercial contract, but who are dependent on or integrated into the firm for which they work. We argue that these dependent self-employed lose their rights under labour law, receive less favourable benefits...

This paper analyzes how non-competes, via wage bargaining, can affect firms’ incentives to provide their employees with on-the-job training. The results show that non-competes increase incentives to provide general training, but reduce those related to specific training.