We use two reserve error definitions found in the literature to investigate the joint impact of previously studied incentives on the magnitude of reserve error. We find many prior conclusions are dependent upon the restricted setting in which the hypotheses are tested and on the definition of...

Using data on the annual resources of state insurance departments we investigate several issues regarding the state production of insurance regulation. First, we demonstrate that the majority of insurance transactions are conducted across state lines suggesting there are potential trans-state...

Traditionally, underwriting performance is considered to be a function of industry-specific institutions. Using quarterly data from 1974 through 1990, we provide evidence of a long-run link between the general economy and the underwriting performance as measured by the combined ratio. Using...

We present experimental evidence on the effect of adverse selection on coverage choices and pricing in corporate insurance markets. Two sets of experimental data are presented to gauge these effects. In the first set, subject behavior appears to conform to the unique equilibrium in which high...

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provides incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive...

We empirically examine two methods for measuring output in property-liability insurer efficiency studies: the value-added approach and the "flow" (or financial intermediation) approach. The approaches are not mutually consistent. The value-added approach is closely related to traditional...

<heading id="h1" level="1" implicit="yes" format="display">ABSTRACT</heading>This paper examines the effect of rate regulation on the management of the property-liability insurer loss reserve. The political cost hypothesis predicts that managers make accounting choices to reduce wealth transfers resulting from the regulatory process. Managers may under-state...

The impact of a statute that is currently in effect depends on expectations about its future constitutionality. We investigate the effect of tort reform by segmenting reforms into those that are eventually declared unconstitutional (temporary) and those that are unchallenged or upheld...