We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...

We present, for the first time, a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. Recognizing the financing constraints that British cost rules may impose on litigants, these new contractual arrangements combine contingency fees with third...

We present a model of recent institutional developments in litigation funding across several European jurisdictions. They combine contingency fees with third party cover for cost in the event of losing the case: we call these "Third Party Contingency" (TPC) contracts. A TPC contract can make...

We consider a model of a single defendant and N plaintiffs where the total cost of litigation is fixed on the part of the plaintiffs and shared among the members of a suing coalition. By settling and dropping out of the coalition, a plaintiff therefore creates a negative externality on the other...

In symmetric common value auctions where bidders differ ex-post in information quality, a seller may benefit from imposing a ceiling on allowable bids. By reducing the winner's curse facing poorly informed bidders, a ceiling encourages them to bid aggressively. This may reduce information rents...

In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract.

We modify a standard Baron-Myerson model by assuming that, instead of knowing the cost of nature, the agent has to incur a cost "c" to learn it. Under these conditions, the principal will offer contracts that, dependind on the value of "c", try to induce the agent to gather or not information....

In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract.