There is an extensive literature claiming that it is often difficult to make use of arbitrage opportunities in financial markets. This paper provides a new reason why existing arbitrage opportunities might not be seized. We consider a world with short-lived securities, no short-selling...

When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibria are constrained suboptimal, which provides a scope for pareto improving interventions. Price regulation can be such a pareto improving policy, even when the welfare effects of rationing are taken into account. An appealing aspect of...

We study a process of bargaining over social outcomes represented by points in theunit interval. The identity of the proposer is determined by a general Markov process and the acceptance of a proposal requires the approval of it by all the players. We show that for every value of the discount...

We consider a class of perfect information bargaining games with unanimity acceptance rule. The proposer and the order of responding players are determined by the state that evolves stochastically over time. The probability distribution of the state in the next period is determined jointly by...

We consider a non-cooperative multilateral bargaining game and study an action-dependent bargaining protocol, that is, the probability with which a player becomes the proposer in a round of bargaining depends on the identity of the player who previously rejected. An important example is the...

We study a process of bargaining over alternatives represented by points in the unit interval. The paper focuses on the asymptotic behavior of the subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies as the continuation probability approaches one. We give a complete characterization of the limit...

This note reexamines the connection between the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution and the equilibria of strategic bargaining games. A first example shows non-convergence to the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. A second example demonstrates the possibility of multiple limits.

We study a model of non-cooperative multilateral unanimity bargaining on a full-dimensional payoff set. The probability distribution with which the proposing player is selected in each bargaining round follows an irreducible Markov process. If a proposal is rejected, negotiations break down with...