This paper examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in REIT governance. We study this issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance structure. In particular, we...

In this paper, we examine the relationship between managerial stock option holdings and the decision to announce a repurchase of the firm's common stock. Managerial stock option holdings should reinforce the traditional undervaluation, free cash flow and capital structure motives for...

This article examines the role of stock option programs and executive holdings of stock options in real estate investment trust (REIT) governance. We study the issue by analyzing how the market reaction to a stock repurchase announcement varies as a function of the individual REIT's governance...

This dissertation consists of three essays covering corporate governance, agency costs and asset pricing. The recent spate of corporate governance scandals has led to the emergence of several commercial governance rating agencies which rate firms on their strength of governance mechanisms. In...

This paper examines whether takeover defenses (i.e., poison pills and classified boards) can enhance the bargaining position of the target firm, especially when the target advisor is a top-tier investment bank. I find that classified boards and poison pills are positively linked to target's...

Extant theory and empirical evidence indicate that equity-based compensation can align the interests of managers with those of shareholders, but it has a side effect of aggravating bondholder-shareholder conflicts by increasing managers' risk-shifting incentives. Recent evidence confirms that...