Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm's-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments....

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm's-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments....

Many financial markets are characterized by strong relationships and networks, rather than arm s-length, spot-market transactions. We examine the performance consequences of this organizational choice in the context of relationships established when VCs syndicate portfolio company investments,...

We examine whether networks among incumbent venture capital firms help restrict entryinto local VC markets in the U.S., thus improving VCs bargaining power overentrepreneurs. We show that VC markets with more extensive networking among theincumbent players experience less entry. The effect is...

We examine whether strong networks among incumbent venture capital firms help restrict entry into local VC markets in the U.S., thus improving VCs' bargaining power over entrepreneurs. We show that VC markets with more extensive networking among the incumbent players experience less entry. The...

How should policy be optimally designed when a monetary authority faces a private sector that is somewhat skeptical about policy announcements and which interprets economic data as providing evidence about the monetary authority's preferences or its ability to carry through on policy plans? To...

We study the role rumors play in revolutions using a global game model. Agents with diverse private information rationally evaluate the informativeness of rumors about the regime strength. Without communication among agents, wild rumors are discounted and agents are generally less responsive to...

How should policy be optimally designed when a monetary authority faces a private sector that is skeptical about policy announcements and makes inferences about the monetary authority’s ability to follow through on policy plans from economic data? To provide an answer to this question, we...

In this paper, we examine how learning about disaster risk affects asset pricing in an endowment economy. We extend the literature on rare disasters by allowing for two sources of uncertainty: (1) the lack of historical data results in unknown parameters for the disaster process, and (2) the...

An informational role of policy arises in economies where large fluctuations are triggered by selffulfilling expectation switches between efficient "optimism" and inefficient "pessimism," a feature that is common in many dynamic economies with coordination failures. Policy affects the...