We examine whether companies select compensation peer groups opportunistically to increase CEO pay. Using 608 firms from the Samp;P 1500, 2,154 peer firms identified from their proxy statements, and a pool of potential peers representing the firm's labor market in which it competes for talent,...

This paper empirically investigates the influence of executive wealth diversification on firm equity granting patterns. Risk-averse, undiversified executives that hold substantial amounts of wealth in the firm, discount the value of their equity holdings, which increases costly risk-sharing and...

We examine the relation between shareholder investment horizon and CEO horizon incentives derived from compensation contracts. We find that influential incumbent shareholders provide managers with short-horizon incentives to maximize current firm value when these shareholders plan to sell their...

We examine whether compensation consultants' potential cross-selling incentives explain more lucrative CEO pay packages using 755 firms from the Samp;P 1500 for 2006. Critics allege that these incentives lead consultants to bias their advice to secure greater revenues from their clients (Waxman,...

We document that firms included in the ExecuComp database tend to be larger, more complex, followed by more analysts, have greater stock liquidity levels, and have higher total, but less concentrated, institutional ownership than other firms. Based on these differences, we test and find support...

We analyze the contribution of production factors to revenue growth in almost the complete universe of U.S. hospitals, accounting for quality and productivity. Production factors (capital, labor, energy, materials and drugs) contributed 70% (drugs alone contributed 52 %), better health outcomes...