We study general equilibrium asset prices in a multi-period endowment economy when agents’ risk aversion is allowed to depend on the maturity of the risk. We find horizon-dependent risk aversion preferences generate a decreasing term structure of risk premia if and only if volatility is...

We provide a preference-based rationale for endogenous overconfidence. Horizon-dependent risk aversion, combined with a possibility to forget, can generate overconfidence and excessive risk taking in equilibrium. An “anxiety prone” agent, who is more risk-averse to imminent than to distant...

Motivated by individuals' emotional response to risk at different time horizons, we model an 'anxious' agent--one who is more risk averse with respect to imminent risks than distant risks. Such preferences describe well-documented features of 1) individual behavior, 2) equilibrium prices, and 3)...

I incorporate loss aversion in a consumption-based asset pricing model with recursive preferences and solve for asset prices in closed-form. I find loss aversion increases expected returns substantially relative to the standard recursive utility model. This feature of my model improves the...

We propose a theory of inattention solely based on preferences, absent any cognitive limitations, or external costs of acquiring information. Under disappointment aversion, information decisions and risk attitude are intertwined, and agents are intrinsically information averse. We illustrate...

We construct a new systemic risk measure that quantifies vulnerability to fire-sale spillovers using detailed regulatory balance sheet data for U.S. commercial banks and repo market data for broker-dealers. Even for moderate shocks in normal times, fire-sale externalities can be substantial. For...

We construct a new systemic risk measure that quantifies vulnerability to fire-sale spillovers using detailed regulatory balance-sheet data for U.S. commercial banks and repo market data for broker-dealers. Even for moderate shocks in normal times, fire-sale externalities can be substantial. For...

We survey the literature on payout policy, with a particular emphasis on developments in the past two decades. The cross-sectional empirical evidence for the traditional motivations behind firms paying out (agency, signaling, and taxes) is most persuasive with regard to agency considerations....

We provide a rational model of capital allocation to projects with uncertain exposure to a systematic risk factor. We show that signal-to-noise ratios are highest when the factor realization is close to zero. As a result, investors redirect more resources across projects during these times. This...

To answer this question, we first create a measure of the opportunity costs of holding liquid assets as the wedge between the cost of capital and the return of firms’ cash portfolio. Exploiting both cross-sectional and time-series variation of opportunity costs, we estimate a negative...