This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with financial contracts. We concentrate on non-exclusive credit relationships, those where an entrepreneur can simultaneously accept more than one contractual offer. Several homogeneous lenders compete on the...

This paper studies the relationship between competition and incentives in an economy with financial contracts. We concentrate on non-exclusive credit relationships, those where an entrepreneur can simultaneously accept more than one contractual offer. Several homogeneous lenders compete on the...

In multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard, we provide sufficient conditions for the outcomes of pure-strategy equilibria in direct mechanisms to be preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. The conditions include strong robustness in the direct...

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. We identify a class of two-way communication mechanisms which mirror those considered in the single principal analysis of Myerson (1982). In such mechanisms, every agent truthfully reveals her type to all principals,...

We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard: principals compete through mechanisms in the presence of agents who take unobservable actions. In this context, we provide a rationale for restricting principals to make use of simple mechanisms, which correspond to direct...