We characterize the steady state of a market with random matching and bargaining, where the sellers' goods can perish overnight. Generically, the quantity traded is suboptimal, prices are dispersed and there is a dead-weight loss caused by excess supply or demand. In the limit as the cost of...

This paper adds to the growing literature on stochastic evolutionary models. These models can be characterised by small probability shocks or mutations which perturb the system away from its deterministic evolution, allowing it to move between equilibria over a long period of time. Much of the...

We present a multi-unit common value auction model with capacity constraints which ensure the participants face a residual market. We show that a discriminatory auction performs better than a uniform one when such constraints are present. We then look at a more explicit model of electricity...

We extend Milgrom and Weber's affiliated valuations model to the multi-unit case. We show that the discriminatory auction has a unique equilibrium, that corresponds to Milgrom and Weber's first-price equilibrium in the 2-bidder, constant marginal valuations case. This unique equilibrium...