The discussion about the bias due to input (or output) aggregation in efficiency measurement based on data envelopment analysis, recently revisited by Tauer (2001) and Fare and Zelenyuk (2002) is continued. Attention is focused on the direction and the bounds of the aggregation bias.

This paper develops two cost decompositions based on the multiplicative and additive Russell efficiency measurement framework. While the multiplicative cost decomposition is a straightforward extension of the standard cost decomposition, the decomposition we develop in this paper incorporates...

This paper develops a slack-based decomposition of profit efficiency based on a direc- tional distance function. It complements Cooper, Pastor, Aparicio and Borras (2011).

This note shows that the Nerlovian profit indicator may be aggregated over firms into an industry measure of profit efficiency. The note also provides conditions under which the technical component of the indicator may also be aggregated.

The last two decades have witnessed a revival in interest in the measurement of productive efficiency pioneered by (1957) and (1951). 1978 was a watershed year in this revival with the christening of DEA by (1978) and the critique of Farrell technical efficiency in terms of axiomatic production...

This paper reviews 70 estimates of the price elasticity of demand for many different transport modes and market situations. The paper presents figures separately for passenger and freight transport and include estimates of both own-price and mode choice elasticities. It also presents some...

Fixed effects models are the gold standard in empirical well-being research, however, their applicability is limited to controlling for intercept heterogeneity and identifying effects of timevarying variables. This paper investigates the usefulness of random coecient models in con- trolling for...

This article considers whether a monopolist is able to deter more efficient entrants through contracting with buyers. In the antitrust literature, the Chicago School's stand is that such contracts cannot be anticompetitive; hence vertical contracts should be accorded per se legal status. In a...

This paper considers the competitive effects of exclusive dealing contracts in a three-player game: an incumbent, an entrant who is more efficient but capacity constrained, and a buyer. The author shows that exclusive dealing contracts may represent an effective entry barrier--the incumbent is...