This paper studies how the possibility for firms to sign collusive agreements (as for instance being part of alliances, cartels and mergers) may affect their quality and price choice in a market with vertically differentiated goods. For this purpose we model the firm decisions as a three-stage...

We analyse the optimal pricing choice of an incumbent firm that sells a good with network externalities and is threatened by the entry of a higher quality variant. In the framework of a vertical differentiation model, we find a necessary and sufficient condition under which quality improvement...

In this paper we analyze how the technology used by downstream firms can influence input and output market prices resulting from collusive agreements between some downstream and upstream firms. We show via an example that both these prices increase under a decreasing returns technology while the...

We consider a monopoly producing a good whose demand grows over time. Whatever the price policy which is adopted, the monopolist invests in order to meet the resulting demand growth. She can only invest in indivisible factory units. We identify the optimal price policy, and the ensuing optimal...

We analyse how market competition in a vertically differentiated polluting industry is affected by product variants that comply at different levels with "green" social norms. A green consumption behavior is considered as a byword of good citizenship. Consumer preferences depend on a combination...

We analyze the effects of labor migration flows on income taxation between two countries (regions) differing by the size of their population and the level of productive efficiencies. Residents, otherwise identical, are heterogeneous because they incur different migration costs. Each resident...

In this paper we generalize the approach developed in the context of banking competition by Gabszewicz et al. (2011). In an entry/acquisition game, we allow the potential entrant in a vertically differentiated market to offer a variant lying at any level of the quality ladder and playing a...