In this article we construct a network of roads connecting large Indian cities and we evaluate this network’s overall performance. We consider a model where the production efforts of connected cities are strategic complements, and we relate the equilibrium effort proï¬le to a well known...

We study network games under strategic complementarities. Agents are embedded in a fixed network. They choose a positive, continuous action and interact with their network neighbors. Interactions are positive and actions are bounded from above. We first derive new sufficient conditions for...

We consider agents playing a linear network game with strategic complementarities. We analyse the problem of a policy maker who can change the structure of the network in order to increase the aggregate efforts of the individuals and/or the sum of their utilities, given that the number of links...

We consider a model of interdependent efforts, with linear interaction and lower bound on effort. Our setting encompasses asymmetric interaction and heterogeneous agents’ characteristics. We examine the impact of a rise of cross-effects on aggregate efforts. We show that the sign of the...

We examine the impact of informal risk sharing on risk taking incentives when transfers are organized through a social network. A bilateral partial sharing rule satisfies that neighbors share equally a part of their revenue. In such a society, correlated technologies generate interdependent risk...

We study network games with linear best-replies and strategic complementarities. We assume that actions are continuous but bounded from above. We show that there is always a unique equilibrium. We find that two key features of these games under small network effects may not hold when network...

We consider agents playing a linear network game with strategic complementarities. We analyse the problem of a policy maker who can change the structure of the network in order to increase the aggregate efforts of the individuals and/or the sum of their utilities, given that the number of links...

We address the problem of a planner looking for the efficient network when agents play a network game with local complementarities and links are costly. We show that for general network cost functions, efficient networks belong to the class of Nested-Split Graphs. Next, we refine our results and...

In a vertically differentiated oligopoly, firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other. It is shown that heterogeneity in quality and in cost functions reduces individual incentives to form links. Furthermore, both differentiated Cournot and Bertrand competition...

This paper describes inter-firm partnerships in three major high-tech industries over the 1985-2005 period. We found that the architecture of the respective networks had evolved toward a 'small world' in the early 1990s. We also found that the number of alliances collapsed in the late 1990s....