A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to accept a request by presenting evidence. A persuasion rule specifies what evidence is persuasive. This paper compares static and dynamic rules. We present a single linear program (i) whose solution corresponds to the listener's optimal dynamic rule...

We study a seller's optimal mechanism for maximizing revenue when a buyer may present evidence relevant to her value. We show that a condition very close to transparency of buyer segments is necessary and sufficient for the optimal mechanism to be deterministic--hence akin to classic third...

We study identification of combinatorial valuations from aggregate demand. Each utility function takes as arguments subsets or, alternatively, quantities of the multiple goods. We exploit mathematical insights from auction theory to generically identify the distribution of utility functions. In...

We study a variant of a random utility model that takes a probability distribution over preference relations as its primitive. We do not model products using a space of observed characteristics. The distribution of preferences is only partially identified using cross-sectional data on varying...

We study the nonparametric identification of distributions of utility functions in a multiple purchase setting with a finite number of consumers. Each utility function takes as arguments subsets or, alternatively, quantities of the multiple goods. We exploit mathematical insights from auction...

This paper studies a game of persuasion. A speaker attempts to persuade a listener to take an action by presenting evidence. Glazer and Rubinstein (2006) showed that when the listener's decision is binary, neither randomization nor commitment have any value for the listener, and commented that...