Under Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of corruption between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing...

This paper examines the main determinants of firms tax evasion and corruption in the formal industrial sector. In our model psychological morale of bureaucratic agents are important to explain corruption.It is shown that the presence of rents linked to favoritism and patronage practices is...

This paper is part of a large research agenda by our Institute on the causes and consequences of moroccan corruption . This paper analyzes theoretically and empirically the main determinants of firms corruption in Morocco firms in the formal sector. It is shown that the presence of rents linked...

Most of the studies which have investigated the link between corruption and poverty may draw conclusions on causality in the form of models that only show correlation. This study is set out to investigate the Granger causal relationship between corruption and poverty. It uses dynamic panel...

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...