The presentation of Table 2 in the original version of this article (quot;A Survey of Stackelberg Differential Game Models in Supply and Marketing Channelsquot;, Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp., 385-413, 2007) contained a few typos. The corrected Table 2...

We study a two-period supply chain in which a manufacturer produces a product, learns to reduce cost, and sells it through a retailer with a price-dependent demand. The manufacturer's second-period production cost declines linearly in the first-period production with a random learning rate. The...

This paper investigates a decentralized assembly system that consists of one manufacturer and multiple suppliers who produce the complementary components. In a single selling season, the manufacturer initially sets a vendor inventory liability period (VILP) to control the suppliers' delivery...

Dynamic Stackelberg game models have been used to study sequential decision making in noncooperative games in various fields. In this paper we give relevant dynamic Stackelberg game models, and review their applications to operations management and marketing channels. A common feature of these...

We obtain optimal emission levels and abatement expenditures in a finite-horizon transboundary pollution game with emission trading between two regions.We show that emission trading has significant impact on the optimal strategies and profits of the two regions. We find that cooperation between...

This study investigates the strategic effect of return policies in a dual-channel supply chain, in which a manufacturer can sell products directly to end customers and indirectly via an independent retailer. The manufacturer decides whether to implement a return policy in either the direct or...

A nearly explicit feedback Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium is obtained in a dynamic distribution channel consisting of a manufacturer and two competing asymmetric retailers engaged in promoting the manufacturer's product to be sold through the retailers. The manufacturer decides on its support for...